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MICROSIMULATION FRAMEWORK FOR URBAN  35 
PRICE-TAKER MARKETS 36 
 37 
ABSTRACT 38 
In the context of integrated transportation and other urban engineering infrastructure systems, 39 
there are many examples of markets, where consumers exhibit price-taking behaviour. While this 40 
behaviour is ubiquitous, the underlying mechanism can be captured in a single framework. Here, 41 
we present a microsimulation framework of a price-taker market that recognizes this generality 42 
and develop efficient algorithms for the associated market clearing problem. By abstracting the 43 
problem as a specific graph theoretic problem (i.e. maximum weighted bipartite graph), first we 44 
are able to exploit algorithms that are developed in graph theory. We then explore their 45 
appropriateness in terms of large-scale integrated urban microsimulations. Based on which, we 46 
further develop a generic and efficient clearing algorithm that takes advantage of the features 47 
specific to urban price-taker markets. This clearing solution is then used to operationalize two 48 
price-taker markets, from two different contexts, within a microsimulation of urban systems. The 49 
initial validation of results against the observed data generally shows a close match.  50 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 51 
The importance of microsimulation as a framework, to analyse integrated urban infrastructure 52 
systems, has been emphasized in recent integrated transportation and land use modelling 53 
literature (Wegner, 1995; Miller and Roorda, 2003; Miller, 2008; Hunt, Kriger, and Miller, 54 
2005). Microsimulation provides a comprehensive and flexible framework for modelling the 55 
behaviour of individual agents as well as representing the various processes that drive urban 56 
evolution (Orcutt, 1957, 1990). In the microsimulation of urban systems, two important 57 
dimensions to capture are the decision making of individual agents (or groups of agents1), and 58 
their interactions with other agents in the markets. In the past forty years, modelling and analysis 59 
of decision making (e.g. households and firms’ location, mode, and vehicle choice decisions, 60 
etc.) in the urban context have received considerable importance from economics, transportation, 61 
environment, energy, real estate, and urban planning literature. However, the modelling of inter-62 
agent interactions within urban markets (e.g. housing, freight, airline seats auctions, etc.) remains 63 
relatively unexplored (Miller et al., 2004, Zhang and Levinson, 2004). 64 
Farooq (2011) conceptualized urban markets as the encapsulation of interactions between 65 
seller/producer and buyer/consumer agents that result in the exchange of a service/good and a 66 
monetary transaction. The goal of both buyers and sellers within this interaction is to achieve 67 
some desirable gain in terms of their profit/utility. Based on how the monetary value is 68 
formulated in this interaction, these markets can be categorized as either Price-Taker or Price-69 
Formation markets. In both price-taker and price-formation markets there exist producer/seller 70 
and consumer/buyer agents that are profit/utility maximizers with varying levels of information 71 
about the market. Producers list their good at a certain asking price in the market. Consumers 72 
                                                
1 Decision Making Unit (DMU) is the generic term used for individual or group of agents that are involved in 
decision making (Miller, 2005a, b). 
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form their choice sets from the available options in the market. In the price-taker case consumers 73 
are assumed to accept the asking price as it is and determine the gain in their utility/profit at that 74 
price. By comparing the relative gains among the choices available to it, a consumer may decide 75 
on choosing one option. In terms of microsimulation, the modelling of price-taker market 76 
clearing problem thus becomes a matching problem in which the modeller is interested in finding 77 
out “who gets what”. The price determination and choice set formation models are exogenous to 78 
the clearing process. At a given exogenously determined price surface for the stock and choice 79 
sets of the buyer agents, the sequence of individual level clearing in the market thus guides the 80 
matching process. 81 
This can be contrasted with price-formation markets, in which prices do not remain fixed 82 
during the clearing process but rather are determined within the market clearing process. In terms 83 
of microsimulation, the modelling of price-formation market clearing problem is a matching 84 
problem in which the modeller is interested in finding out “who gets what at what price”. 85 
Examples of classic approaches that used market equilibrium to formulate prices are Alonso 86 
(1964), Putman (1983), Echenique et al. (1990), Martinez (1992), Anas and Arnott (1993), 87 
(1994), and de la Barra (1995). Farooq (2011) proposed a disequilibrium-based comprehensive 88 
microsimulation framework for modelling urban price-formation markets and operationalized it 89 
for the owner-occupied housing market in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area within the 90 
ILUTE (Miller et al., 2011) modelling system. Other examples of operational urban price-91 
formation markets can be found in Waddell et al. (2003), Ettema et al. (2006), and Devisch et al. 92 
(2008).  93 
The focus of this paper is on the urban price-taker markets. Here we present a generalized 94 
clearing framework developed for the urban price-taker markets, by reducing the clearing 95 
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problem of the market to a graph theoretic problem. Such a market is represented as a bipartite 96 
graph in which consumers and products/producers are the vertices of the two sides; choice sets 97 
are the edges; and the unidirectional/bidirectional preferences are the weights on the edges. By 98 
doing so, the algorithms developed for finding the solution for maximum weighted bipartite 99 
matching problem are directly used to find the clearing solution for the urban price-taker 100 
markets. The generalized nature of the formulation ensures that the proposed mechanism can be 101 
used for clearing various urban markets that comes under the category of price-taker market. The 102 
market clearing problem discussed here is equivalent to an assignment problem, which is a 103 
special case of a class of linear programming problems called the transportation problem. To 104 
find a solution for an assignment problem, the predominantly used algorithm for transportation 105 
problems, called transportation simplex, is inefficient (Winston, 1991). Thus, in the literature, 106 
alternative approaches are developed to find the solution for assignment problems. As an initial 107 
exploration, here we first employ the most commonly used algorithm of such category, in order 108 
to explore various features and appropriateness of these graph theoretic algorithms in the context 109 
of large-scale integrated urban microsimulations. Based on this analysis we then develop an 110 
algorithm for optimum allocation under the computational and memory constraints that may rise 111 
due to the very large size of the market, in the microsimulation of urban systems. 112 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists the model’s assumptions, 113 
introduces the market model structure, clearing problem, and develops the methodology for 114 
finding the clearing solution. Section 3 then presents our proposed solution which adopts a 115 
probabilistic individual utility maximization approach. In Section 4, we present the application of 116 
the proposed framework to two important urban markets. In the last section, we present our 117 
concluding remarks and future directions of the research. 118 
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2. PRICE-TAKER MARKETS: MODEL STRUCTURE 119 
2.0    Key Assumptions and Definitions 120 
There are two types of agents in the market: consumer agents (persons, households and firms, 121 
etc.) and producer agents (persons, households, airlines, builders, landlords, etc.). The 122 
assumptions concerning each of these agents are listed below. 123 
Generic assumptions: 124 
• Agents maximize their individual profit/utility 125 
• Agents are non-cooperative with varying degrees of information about the market 126 
• The market perceptions (information) of agents are updated as they spend more time in 127 
the market 128 
• Agents have the option to stay or leave the market at any time 129 
• The utility function for both consumer and producer agents are exogenously defined 130 
Consumer assumptions: 131 
• Each consumer is looking for a single unit of good to purchase/lease 132 
• There is an exogenous mechanism that generates a choice set for each consumer. This 133 
process models the choice set generation process of the consumer. The choice sets 134 
generated by this process for all the consumers will then be used by the clearing 135 
mechanism. There may be an indirect interaction between market clearing and choice 136 
set generation process. For instance: the shortage of certain type of good in short-term 137 
that is resulted by faster clearing of that type, may cause the choice set generation 138 
mechanism to adjust the choice set of the active consumers based on their reaction 139 
• Due to changing market perceptions, buyers may update their choice sets over time 140 
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• The differences among the behaviour of consumers are captured in the utility function 141 
and the choice set generation mechanism 142 
Producer assumptions: 143 
• Each producer is offering a single unit of good for sale/lease 144 
• Due to changing market perceptions, producers may adjust their valuation of a good 145 
Definitions 146 
Vertex [v in set V]: an object that may represent certain real life entity (for instance, 147 
person, household) 148 
Edge [e in set E]: connects one vertex to another. It may convey the relationship between 149 
the two vertices that it connects together (for instance, two persons connected by a sibling 150 
edge) 151 
Weight of an edge [w in set W]: It is an integer or a real value associated with an edge. It 152 
may convey the intensity of a relationship between the two vertices the edge is connecting 153 
Association of an edge: It is the set of two vertices that an edge is connected to 154 
Graph [G = (V; E, W)]: It is an ordered pair consisting of a set of vertices V connected by 155 
edges from set E having weights from set W 156 
Adjacent vertices (vi, vj): Two vertices vi and vj in a graph that are directly connected by an 157 
edge (eij) of the same graph 158 
Cardinality: Number of elements in the set. If 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑 , then the cardinality 𝐴  is 4 159 
Disjoint sets: Sets whose intersection is the empty set. There is no common element 160 
between the disjoint sets. If 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑  and 𝐵 = 𝑓,𝑔, ℎ  then set A and B are disjoint 161 
 7 
2.1    Model Structure 162 
Suppose that in a price-taker market, there are N consumers interested in buying/leasing a 163 
differentiated good offered by M producers, offering one good each. Before making a selection, 164 
consumers generate a list of goods (i.e. choice set) that are of interest. They establish preferences 165 
for each good within their choice set which are based on their consumption behaviour and the 166 
attributes of the goods. Producers may also assign a value to the good that influences their 167 
preferences for each consumer. If the choice set and individual degree of preferences for all 168 
consumers/producers are known, we can express the market in the form of a bipartite graph (G). 169 
A bipartite graph is a type of graph that has two disjoint vertex sets, such that no two vertices in 170 
the same set are adjacent (Wilson, 1979; Gondran and Minoux, 1984; and Cormen et al., 2001). 171 
Let the graph in Figure 1 be represented by G = (C, P; E), where C and P are the two disjoint 172 
sets and 𝐸 ⊆ 𝐶×𝑃 represents the set of edges between the vertices of the two sets. Note that the 173 
intersection of sets C and P is a null set and the cardinality of their union is the sum of their 174 
individual cardinalities. Also, if 𝐸! ⊂ 𝐸 is a set of edges strictly between vertices in set C and 175 𝐸! ⊂ 𝐸 is a set of edges strictly between vertices in set P then the cardinality of both 𝐸! and 𝐸! 176 
is strictly zero. An alternate way of defining this property is that every edge in set E is associated 177 
with one and only one vertex from each of the two disjoint vertex sets (C and P). 178 
 179 
Figure 1: A Bipartite Graph G = (C, P; E) 180 
c1 
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In Figure 1, let set C represent the list of consumers and let set P represent the list of 181 
producers in the market. The preferences between C and P are represented by the edges between 182 
them, which belong to set E with the weights on each edge representing the individual degree of 183 
preference. These edges can be unidirectional or bidirectional. The unidirectional edges represent 184 
the case where only consumers generate a choice set and assign a certain degree of preference to 185 
each choice. An example of such a case is the rental housing market where the renters look at the 186 
available options in the market and form their choice sets and preferences. In the case of 187 
bidirectional edges, the mutual preferences are formed as a function of individual preferences of 188 
both consumers and producers to each other. An example of this case is potential couples that are 189 
matched in an abstract process which we define as a “marriage market”. Both rental and 190 
marriage markets are discussed in more detail in Section 4. 191 
2.2    Price-Taker Market Clearing as a Matching Problem of a Bipartite Graph 192 
The clearing problem for an urban price-taker market requires using the available choice sets and 193 
the degrees of preferences to determine the one-to-one matching between consumers and 194 
producers. This matching problem, under the graph abstraction of the market defined in the 195 
previous section, can be restated as a problem of finding the maximum weighted bipartite 196 
matching. This approach provides the “best” possible matches that can be made for the market at 197 
hand. Suppose that for every edge e in set E, there is an associated weight w in set 𝑊:𝐶×𝑃 → ℝ 198 
then G = (C, P; E, W) and the problem of finding maximum weighted bipartite matching can be 199 
defined as finding a graph G* = (C, P; E*, W*) such that the cardinality of E* equals cardinality 200 
of C and P. Every vertex in set C is connected to one and only one vertex in set P by an edge in 201 
E* and there are no more than one edge associated with each vertex. Moreover, there doesn’t 202 
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exist a graph G** = (C, P; E**, W**) such that the sum of weights in W** is greater than sum of 203 
weights in W*  204 
i.e.  𝑊∗(𝑐, 𝑒 𝑐 )!∈! ≥ 𝑊∗∗(𝑐, 𝑒 𝑐 )!∈! , where 𝑒:𝐶 → 𝑃. 205 
In the graph theory literature, the problem of maximum weighted matching or assignment 206 
has extensively been studied and various efficient algorithms have been developed for this 207 
purpose. The problem has proven to be a special case of the minimum cost flow problem, and 208 
thus can be solved using linear programming algorithms (Burkard et. al., 2009). Hungarian 209 
algorithm is the most commonly used solution for the assignment problem and various variants 210 
of it are proposed in the literature. In ILUTE, we first used one such modified version of the 211 
Hungarian algorithm in order to implement the clearing process for the urban price-taker market. 212 
3. PRICE-TAKER MARKETS: CLEARING SOLUTIONS 213 
3.1    Hungarian Algorithm 214 
Kuhn (1955) used the König’s matching theorem (König, 1931) and Egerváry’s generalization of 215 
it to the weighted bipartite case (Egerváry, 1931) in order to derive the Hungarian algorithm for 216 
finding the maximum weight perfect matching in a bipartite graph (Frank, 2004). The Hungarian 217 
algorithm is based on a linear programming approach that involves transforming the problem 218 
into combinatorial optimization problem. Suppose the graph G = (C, P; E, W) in Figure 2a is 219 
represented by M which is a 𝑛×𝑛 matrix. The rows in matrix M represent set C and its columns 220 
represent the set P. The value of each cell represents the weight of the edge between vertices. If 221 
there is no edge between the two pair of vertices, then the cell value is blank.  222 
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The steps of Hungarian algorithms are as follows 2 (Winston, 1991). 223 
Step 0: Transform the problem into a minimization problem. 224 
Step 1: For each row, subtract off the minimum cell value from rest of the cells. Each row 225 
will have at least one zero and all the values will be greater than or equal to zero. 226 
Step 2: For each column, subtract off the minimum cell value from rest of the cells. Each 227 
row and column will have thus at least one zero. 228 
Step 3: Go through the rows and columns and use lines to cover the zeros in the matrix in 229 
such a way that all the zeros are covered and that no more lines have been drawn than 230 
necessary. Use horizontal line for row and vertical for column. 231 
Step 4: Optimality test: 232 
i. If the count of the lines is n, choose a combination from the modified 233 
matrix in such a way that the sum is zero 234 
ii. If the number of the lines is less than n, go to Step 5. 235 
Step 5. Find the smallest element which is not covered by any of the lines. Then subtract 236 
it from each entry which is not covered by the lines and add it to each entry which is 237 
covered by both a vertical and a horizontal line. Go back to Step 3. 238 
 239 
                                                
2 It is interesting to note that the original algorithm was proposed at the time when computers were not widely in 
use. It was thus designed for the matrix to be solved on a piece of paper. 
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  240 
a. G = (C, P; E, W)   b. G* = (C, P; E*, W*) 241 
Figure 2: Weighted bipartite graph 242 
Note that Kuhn (1955) designed the algorithm for the case of a square matrix, but in the 243 
implementation of urban price-taker markets, this is rarely the case. A typical example is the 244 
rental housing market, where there can be more households than the number of dwellings 245 
available for rent (i.e. rows > columns). In that case, the rectangular matrix is padded with zero 246 
values columns so that it becomes a square matrix. This way, our solution will allow for 247 
consumer/producers not being able to buy/sell their good at the end of the clearing process. The 248 
original Hungarian algorithm proposed by Kuhn (1955) has a time complexity of 𝑂( 𝐸 𝐶 𝑃 )3.  249 
In the worst case (𝐸 = 𝐶×𝑃) the complexity becomes a polynomial of order 4. Tomizawa (1971) 250 
proposed some modifications to the original algorithm to reduce the complexity to a polynomial 251 
of order 3. In the current implementation of ILUTE, we implemented the version proposed by 252 
Tomizawa.  253 
3.2    Issues with a System Optimal Solutions 254 
Winston (1991) showed that the solution computed by the Hungarian algorithm would provide 255 
the optimal solution to assignment type problems. This implies that a market clearing solution 256 
                                                
3 Time complexity O() of an algorithm explains how it’s computational time will respond to the change in the size 
input (Cormen et al., 2001). Hungarian algorithm’s computational time is a product function of number of edges and 
total vertices. 
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that employs the Hungarian algorithm presents a system optimal solution, where the maximum 257 
sum of profits/utilities is obtained given a certain market. However, system optimal conditions 258 
may not be the best way to represent true urban market conditions, as can be observed in the case 259 
of user vs. system optimal flows in transportation networks or in modelling the marriages within 260 
demographic update module of an agent-based urban modelling system. Both consumers and 261 
producers are not expected to sacrifice their individual profits/utilities to improve society’s 262 
overall utility. If that were the case, drivers would use longer individual routes just to keep the 263 
system level travel time low. Or brides and grooms may not marry their true love for the sake of 264 
the greater good of the society! 265 
Furthermore, a deterministic system optimal solution leaves out the impact of uncertainty 266 
on the urban price-taker markets. Arguably, this stochasticity is an important driver for these 267 
markets’ results. A landlord seeking to rent out an apartment will not wait until he has surveyed 268 
all possible tenants. Often instead the landlord settles on one of the first tenants that meets his 269 
asking price. In a similar vein, people who get married forgo the possibility of finding a better 270 
match had they remained single. Clearly, these two simple examples illustrate that the rather 271 
strong assumptions with a deterministic system optimal solution fails to capture important 272 
features of urban price-taker markets. 273 
Finally, another shortcoming of the Hungarian algorithm for this application is the 274 
computational and memory size requirements that come from manipulating large matrices 275 
involved in the algorithm (i.e. operationalization for very large-scale markets). Gillett (1976) and 276 
Winston (1991) reported that in large-scale assignment problems, finding the minimum number 277 
of lines in the serial version of the Hungarian algorithm might not be computationally cost 278 
effective. 279 
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3.3    A Probabilistic Approach 280 
To deal with these issues in the serial implementation, we propose a probabilistic approach that 281 
relaxes the assumptions made regarding the maximization of the market’s overall utility by 282 
introducing some stochasticity in the approach. Our proposed method is more representative of 283 
the real life markets and is less burdensome with respect to computational time and memory 284 
requirements as well.  285 
The simple algorithm for finding G* = (C, P; E*, W*) is as follows: 286 
Step 1: With a predefined random distribution, pick between set C or P4 287 
Step 2: From the selected set, choose a vertex v1 using another predefined random 288 
distribution 289 
Step 3: For v1 choose v2 such that 𝑤!" ≥ 𝑤!!∀  𝑉 → 𝑣!, where V is the set that was not 290 
chosen in Step 1 291 
Step 4: Remove v1 and v2 and all the edges associated with them 292 
Step 5: Stop if either C or P becomes null set. Else, go to Step 1 293 
The probabilistic approach reduces the complexity of the matching processes to 294 𝑂(𝑚𝑎𝑥  ( 𝐶 , 𝑃 )). Note that this algorithm results in linear complexity compared to cubic in the 295 
case of the Hungarian algorithm. Moreover, it is not dependent on the number of edges thus 296 
reducing the variability between the worst and best cases. The probabilistic approach does not 297 
guarantee perfect matching, but gives us an adequate solution that respects both individual 298 
profit/utility maximization and uncertainty. This approach is more representative of the real 299 
                                                
4 Examples: predefined random distribution can be uniform (0.5, 0.5) such that both sets have equal probability of 
being chosen. Or it can be restricted to choosing from only one set by setting the probability of selection to 1 
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price-taker markets in transportation, where due to the sequence of events and the limited 300 
amount of information available to the agents, the clearing of market doesn’t always result in a 301 
perfect matching.  302 
4.    APPLICATIONS 303 
4.1    Price-Taker Markets in ILUTE 304 
In the urban systems modelling and microsimulation research, many urban markets can be 305 
expressed as the price-taker market formulation introduced in Section 2. A few examples of such 306 
markets include: labour, rental housing, airline seat auctions, bus routes, and spot-freight 307 
markets. Here we present the operationalization of two very important markets within ILUTE, 308 
using the price-taker market formulation. 309 
The microsimulation modelling of activity-based travel demand and land use evolution 310 
requires maintaining the socio-economic characteristics of individual decision makers 311 
throughout the simulation horizon. This can be achieved by the implementation of a 312 
sophisticated demographic update mechanism within these systems. In ILUTE, the demographic 313 
update involves various processes that deal with a person’s birth, education-level, driving 314 
licence, aging, death, marriage, divorce, and migration—the details of which can be found in 315 
Miller et al. (2008). 316 
4.2    Marriage Market Model 317 
For this paper, the process of managing agents’ marriages in the simulation is of particular 318 
interest. In terms of the implementation of this process in a microsimulation framework, 319 
marriages can be abstracted as a market clearing problem in which currently single males and 320 
females are to be matched according to their mutual preferences. To achieve that, we reduce the 321 
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process to a price-taker market formulation, which we call a marriage market. This market 322 
matches prospective husbands and wives together within a utility maximization framework.  323 
At each time step in the ILUTE microsimulation, the decision of whether to look for a 324 
potential marital partner for all adults is first evaluated. This results in two pools of single men 325 
and single women. The marriage process then determines the choice set for every individual 326 
using predefined search criteria (e.g. spatial proximity, age difference, etc.). The random utility 327 
based model that was estimated by Choo et al. (2008) was adapted for ILUTE and is used to 328 
compute the utility of each potential couple. These utilities are based on the potential couple’s 329 
income(s), education, and the male/female ratios in their respective geographic areas. 330 
The two pools of males and females that are active in the marriage market here can be 331 
represented by the set C and P of the bipartite graph formulated in Section 2. A node in set C can 332 
represent a male in the pool of potential husbands, and a node in set P can represent a female in 333 
the pool of potential wives. The choice sets of all the individuals active in the marriage market 334 
can be expressed by the edges between sets C and P, while the mutual utility is represented by 335 
the weight on the edges between the sets’ elements (i.e. the potential couple). This reduces the 336 
marriage market to the price-taker formulation suggested in Section 2. Moreover, the clearing of 337 
marriage market then becomes equivalent to the problem of finding the maximum bipartite graph 338 
under the conditions defined in Section 2. Note that the edges in the case of the marriage market 339 
are bidirectional, which represents the fact that the weight on each edge is a function of the 340 
utilities of both the potential bride and groom. 341 
4.3    Marriage Market Operationalization within ILUTE 342 
In the current version of ILUTE (ILUTE v1.0 which is under development), a generic class 343 
called the StaticMarket (Figure 3) is implemented as a super class representing the price-taker 344 
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markets. This class encapsulates all the generic features of such a market, and it is based on the 345 
theoretical framework described in Section 2. The two clearing algorithms discussed in this 346 
paper, are at the moment, implemented in two separate versions of the StaticMarket. However, 347 
we intend to merge them in a single class that provides the option for the children of this class to 348 
select the exact clearing process. Various realizations of price-taker markets, including the 349 
MarriageMarket and RentalMarket, are then inherited from the StaticMarket and implement the 350 
specific features required by the markets they represent. 351 
 352 
Figure 3: Class structure of price-taker markets within ILUTE 353 
 Figure 4 displays a sample relational class diagram for the StaticMarket superclass and 354 
the markets it represents. The superclass contains bidder and good objects that correspond to 355 
both sides of a market, as well as the necessary engines for market operation and clearing. 356 
 357 
Figure 4: Sample relational class diagram 358 
Static	  Market
Bidder
Good
MarketSolver
CleanMarket
ComputeUtility
Marriage	  Market
ComputeUtility
Rental	  Market
ComputeUtility
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4.4    Marriage Market Simulation Results 359 
This subsection presents results from the implementation of the MarriageMarket in the ILUTE 360 
model system. We simulated an initial population representative of the Greater Toronto 361 
Hamilton Area for a period of 15 years (1986–2001). Figure 5 shows the age distribution of 362 
married people in ILUTE as compared to a representative dataset for the GTHA in 2001. For the 363 
most part, the age distribution of married persons is reproduced fairly well. In addition to 364 
maintaining the marital age distribution throughout the simulation, it is also important to 365 
correctly model the age people decide to get married. Table 1 then shows the mean age of brides 366 
and grooms in ILUTE along with comparable historical data. The results are very strong for 367 
simulating the mean marrying age of single and divorced individuals. However, there is some 368 
divergence for the widowed class, which is not unreasonable due to the smaller market share of 369 
widowed persons and the results’ inherent dependency on simulating deaths. 370 
 371 
Figure 5: Comparison of results for age distribution of married-individuals, between ILUTE and 372 
Survey of Household Spending (SHS) for year 2001 373 
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Table 1: Average age by previous marital status of the newly married individuals in (2001) 374 
Average Age of 
Newly Weds 
Statistics 
Canada ILUTE 
% 
Error 
Groom 
Single 29.7 29.1 -2.1 
Widowed 62.4 50.9 -22.6 
Divorced 43.8 44.2 0.9 
Brides 
Single 27.6 27.3 -1.1 
Widowed 55.4 47.5 -16.6 
Divorced 40.3 41.7 3.4 
 375 
 Expanding on the results from Table 1, the marriage rates by age group (i.e. number of 376 
marrying persons divided by the size of the age group) for males and females are displayed on 377 
Figure 6. While the general trend is captured by the model, ILUTE shows systematically higher 378 
marriage rates than the census data.  379 
 380 
Figure 6: ILUTE and census marriage rates by age group (2001) 381 
The previous results have centred on the decision to join the MarriageMarket. The next 382 
results now focus on how well the ILUTE MarriageMarket matches potential couples. Table 2 383 
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shows the distribution of newly wedded couples by age group. Again, the general trend is 384 
captured by the MarriageMarket, with majority of newly married persons being under 35. Note 385 
that historical GTHA values were not available, so national (i.e. Canadian) values were used as 386 
proxies. Besides age, income differences were used to pair up possible marriage matches. Figure 387 
7 shows the distribution of income differences for married couples in the ILUTE simulation in 388 
2001. These results display strong performance in comparison to census values.  389 
Table 2: Distribution of newly married couples by age group (2001) 390 
ILUTE (GTHA Values, 2001) 
  
Age of Husband 
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 
A
ge
 o
f W
ife
 18-24 17.1 8.8 1.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 
25-34 0.5 46.7 4.6 0.6 0.1 0.1 
35-44 0.0 1.1 9.6 1.1 0.2 0.1 
45-54 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.7 1.0 0.2 
55-64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 
65-74 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
Statistics Canada (Canada Values, 2001) 
  
Age of Husband 
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 
A
ge
 o
f W
ife
 18-24 11.5 12.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
25-34 2.8 35.1 9.2 1.0 0.1 0.0 
35-44 0.1 3.1 8.8 3.8 0.6 0.1 
45-54 0.0 0.2 1.4 3.8 1.8 0.3 
55-64 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.7 
65-74 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 
 391 
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 392 
Figure 7: Distribution of income differences (2001) 393 
4.5    Rental Housing Market 394 
Another important application of urban price-taker markets is the market for rental housing. 395 
Housing (rental and owner-occupied) market models are important in the context of urban 396 
microsimulation, as they influence the spatial and temporal distributions of the population in the 397 
region. The two markets may have different dynamics due to regional economics, supply, space-398 
time, and socio-demographics conditions. Though, the two markets influence each other through 399 
agent interactions and lagged signals. Conditions in both rental and owner-occupied housing 400 
markets play key roles in the location decisions of the households. Both market types are 401 
separately implemented in the current version of ILUTE: the owner-occupied housing market is 402 
modelled as a price-formation market (Farooq 2011), while rental housing is modelled as a price-403 
taker market. This clear distinction between the operationalization of two markets in ILUTE 404 
enables it to capture the individual market dynamics while ensuring the interactions between 405 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80+ 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f M
ar
ri
ed
 C
ou
pl
es
 
Income Difference [$1000] 
Census 
ILUTE 
 21 
them through the loose coupling the two. To our knowledge this is the first time that this 406 
distinction between the two markets has been implemented explicitly in an urban model. These 407 
next two subsections focus on the rental housing market in ILUTE, along with initial model 408 
results. 409 
Each year in ILUTE, households evaluate the decision to change their existing locations. 410 
If a household decides to move, it is then faced with the tenure decision, i.e. whether to get active 411 
in the owner-occupied or rental housing market. This decision is based on probability 412 
distributions generated from the Canadian Census data for various income levels of the 413 
households (Giroux-Cook, 2010). Households that decide to rent a dwelling start the search 414 
process for a potential dwelling. In the current implementation, all the active dwellings in the 415 
market are available for consideration to all the active households. The other option that could 416 
have been used was to randomly choose the choice set for each renter. Elgar et al. (2011) 417 
investigated the choice set generation process for firm’s location choice models and suggested 418 
that in forecasting mode, the model considering all the options out-performed the choice set 419 
generation process where a subset of choices were randomly chosen. They also suggested anchor 420 
points based choice set generation processes in the spatial context. With the availability of better 421 
datasets, a more realistic choice set generation process that is inspired by anchor point based 422 
approach can be developed for renting households. 423 
Rents for the active dwellings are determined using the rent-setting model, developed 424 
using average rent data from the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 425 
supplemented by Canadian Census data. In the clearing process, the problem is reduced to 426 
finding a maximum weighted bipartite graph, using the formulation and solution suggested in 427 
Sections 2 and 3. In the current version, the income levels of the households determine the 428 
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weight on the edges. Hence, these weights are unidirectional and represent the assumption that 429 
landlords give the dwelling to the interested household with the highest income. However, 430 
Giroux-Cook (2010) recommends that a random utility-based model be developed that 431 
incorporates the preferences of the households. Moreover, it is pointed out that landlords often 432 
screen out the potential renters due to discrimination against race, gender, class, etc. Giroux-433 
Cook suggests that the utility function of the landlord that expresses this behaviour should also 434 
be included in the weight of the edges. In terms of our formulation, the edges will then 435 
correspond to a bidirectional weights. 436 
4.6    Rental Housing Market Simulation Results 437 
For the validation of the rental market, small samples of 10,000 and 50,000 households were 438 
microsimulated from 1986 to 2006 and their evolution were compared with historical data. Table 439 
3 compares the average rental prices in 2001 with census data. Currently the prices forecasted by 440 
ILUTE are lower and have lesser variance compared. This is due to the fact that the current rent 441 
model operational in ILUTE, is insensitive to neighbourhood characteristics, market conditions, 442 
and accessibility. We plan to replace it with a more detailed model, as soon as we have access to 443 
better datasets. 444 
Table 3: Average rents in Year 2001 445 
 
ILUTE Census 
 
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. 
Total 610.19 241.13 848.03 392.42 
Figure 8 presents the comparison between the spatial distribution of renter households in 446 
ILUTE and the 2001 census. The spatial trend produced by ILUTE generally seems to match the 447 
historical pattern, with a few exceptions, particularly in the Southwest (Hamilton region). Note 448 
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that a more detailed discussion on the results from the operationalized rental market in ILUTE 449 
can be found in Giroux-Cook (2010). 450 
 451 
Figure 8: Spatial distribution of renter households in Year 2001: Census-ILUTE  452 
(darker shades representing higher densities) 453 
5.    CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTION 454 
In literature, few examples can be found on microsimulation modelling of specific price-taker 455 
markets, for instance: Waddell et al. (2003) presented a housing market model while Leombruni 456 
and Richiardi (2011) proposed a microsimulation labour market model. However in this paper, 457 
taking advantage of the similarities among these markets, we presented a single generic 458 
microsimulation framework for modelling the urban price-taker markets that can we used to 459 
model a wide range of markets. Core concepts from graph theory were used to abstract the 460 
market as a bipartite weighted graph. Commonly used algorithm was first explored for its 461 
appropriateness in the context of large-scale microsimulation of urban systems. Based on which, 462 
then an efficient algorithm was developed to find the solution for the market clearing problem.  463 
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We applied the proposed framework to marriage and rental housing markets within 464 
ILUTE modelling system. Due to unavailability of data on actual marriages, the validation of the 465 
results produced by the implemented marriage markets was performed using indirect means. A 466 
close match was found between the evolved simulation population and census. The choice set 467 
generation process and utility function needs to be revisited in the marriage market. Clear 468 
distinction was made between rental owner-occupied markets. In case of owner-occupied market 469 
the endogenous formation of price is a dominant characteristics, while in case of rental market 470 
the rent levels are very much predetermined. We thus modelled the rental market as a price-taker 471 
market. In case of rental market, the comparison between the simulation results and historical 472 
data demonstrated that the current rental model requires further modifications to improve the 473 
accuracy of its results. The three primary areas of improvement needed are (a) estimates of the 474 
number of households getting active in the renting market and (b) estimates of the dwelling 475 
asking rents (c) choice set generation for the renters. 476 
The framework developed here is very rich in term of representing agents’ behaviour and 477 
market characteristics—agents heterogeneity, differences in choice set formation process, market 478 
segments, supply and demand shocks, are some of the key features that can be represented by 479 
this framework. At the same time, it is highly efficient and scalable in terms of microsimulation 480 
operationalization of various urban markets that display price-taker behaviour by consumers. The 481 
proposed implementation has an order of complexity that is linear function of number of active 482 
consumers or producers (depending on whoever are more) in the market. Using the same 483 
framework, we are in the process of operationalizing the labour force market within ILUTE. 484 
Moreover, as a future research direction, we intend to further extend the application of the 485 
proposed framework in the areas like urban freight transportation and air-travel. 486 
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A full-scale microsimulation of the marriage market for the Greater Toronto and 487 
Hamilton Area requires dealing with approximately one hundred thousand agents (including all 488 
active males and females). Within an urban microsimulation system such as ILUTE this results 489 
in very high memory and computational requirements (as is commonly the case in any large 490 
scale microsimulation of urban systems). To overcome such challenges, as an ongoing research, 491 
we are exploring efficient use of readily available multi-core 64-bit computer architecture, by 492 
exploiting access to larger memories and speedup by parallelization. Because of the complex 493 
nature of interactions between the agents, the parallelization of any type of market is non-trivial. 494 
That requires careful partitioning of the problem, resolving various dependencies, and avoiding 495 
deadlocks. In future, we plan to develop specialized algorithms and data structures that are 496 
capable of handling.  497 
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